Managers’ dispositions toward formal contracts: A cross-country examination
Erişim
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessTarih
2023Yazar
Stefanidis, AbrahamBanai, Moshe
Newburry, William
Fainshmidt, Stav
Richter, Ulf Henning
Schinzel, Ursula
Kong, Yin
Erkus, Ahmet
Shakirova, Svetlana
Ozbek, Mehmet Ferhat
Goelzner, Herbert
Shetach, Ana
Erişim
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessÜst veri
Tüm öğe kaydını gösterKünye
Abraham Stefanidis, Moshe Banai, William Newburry, Stav Fainshmidt, Ulf Henning Richter, Ursula Schinzel, Yin Kong, Ahmet Erkus, Svetlana Shakirova, Mehmet Ferhat Ozbek, Herbert Goelzner, Ana Shetach, Unsal Sigri, Managers’ dispositions toward formal contracts: A cross-country examination, Journal of Business Research, Volume 168, 2023Özet
This study integrates institutional and dispositional theories to develop a multilevel model predicting that managers’ endorsement of formal contracts increases with the quality of formal institutions. This effect is contingent upon managerial dispositions of ethical idealism and interpersonal trust, which provide a morally driven override of uncertainty and a substitute source of certainty in business practices, respectively. We test our arguments on hand-collected data from 3,652 manager-negotiators in 16 countries. We find that managers endorse formal contracts when they are embedded in contexts with high quality contract enforcement institutions, but this effect diminishes substantially among ethically idealistic managers. These results suggest that an understanding of managers’ reliance on formal contracts requires multilevel theory informed by how managerial dispositions interact with the formal institutional context. © 2023 Elsevier Inc.
Cilt
168Bağlantı
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148296323005908?via%3Dihubhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12440/6041